AI alignment & security research

This page highlights research projects that have emerged from the MATS program, showcasing MATS fellows’ contributions to AI alignment, transparency, and security.

Featured Research

Sparse Autoencoders Find Highly Interpretable Features in Language Models

One of the roadblocks to a better understanding of neural networks' internals is polysemanticity, where neurons appear to activate in multiple, semantically distinct contexts. Polysemanticity prevents us from identifying concise, human-understandable explanations for what neural networks are doing internally. One hypothesised cause of polysemanticity is \textit{superposition}, where neural networks represent more features than they have neurons by assigning features to an overcomplete set of directions in activation space, rather than to individual neurons. Here, we attempt to identify those directions, using sparse autoencoders to reconstruct the internal activations of a language model. These autoencoders learn sets of sparsely activating features that are more interpretable and monosemantic than directions identified by alternative approaches, where interpretability is measured by automated methods. Moreover, we show that with our learned set of features, we can pinpoint the features that are causally responsible for counterfactual behaviour on the indirect object identification task \citep{wang2022interpretability} to a finer degree than previous decompositions. This work indicates that it is possible to resolve superposition in language models using a scalable, unsupervised method. Our method may serve as a foundation for future mechanistic interpretability work, which we hope will enable greater model transparency and steerability.

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Authors:

Hoagy Cunningham, Aidan Ewart, Logan Riggs, Robert Huben, Lee Sharkey

Fellows:

Hoagy Cunningham

Date:

Sep 15, 2023

Towards Understanding Sycophancy in Language Models

Human feedback is commonly utilized to finetune AI assistants. But human feedback may also encourage model responses that match user beliefs over truthful ones, a behaviour known as sycophancy. We investigate the prevalence of sycophancy in models whose finetuning procedure made use of human feedback, and the potential role of human preference judgments in such behavior. We first demonstrate that five state-of-the-art AI assistants consistently exhibit sycophancy across four varied free-form text-generation tasks. To understand if human preferences drive this broadly observed behavior, we analyze existing human preference data. We find that when a response matches a user's views, it is more likely to be preferred. Moreover, both humans and preference models (PMs) prefer convincingly-written sycophantic responses over correct ones a non-negligible fraction of the time. Optimizing model outputs against PMs also sometimes sacrifices truthfulness in favor of sycophancy. Overall, our results indicate that sycophancy is a general behavior of state-of-the-art AI assistants, likely driven in part by human preference judgments favoring sycophantic responses.

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Authors:

Mrinank Sharma, Meg Tong, Tomasz Korbak, David Duvenaud, Amanda Askell, Samuel R. Bowman, Newton Cheng, Esin Durmus, Zac Hatfield-Dodds, Scott R. Johnston, Shauna Kravec, Timothy Maxwell, Sam McCandlish, Kamal Ndousse, Oliver Rausch, Nicholas Schiefer, Da Yan, Miranda Zhang, Ethan Perez

Fellows:

Meg Tong

Date:

Oct 20, 2023

Steering Language Models With Activation Engineering

Prompt engineering and finetuning aim to maximize language model performance on a given metric (like toxicity reduction). However, these methods do not fully elicit a model's capabilities. To reduce this gap, we introduce activation engineering: the inference-time modification of activations in order to control (or steer) model outputs. Specifically, we introduce the Activation Addition (ActAdd) technique, which contrasts the intermediate activations on prompt pairs (such as"Love"versus"Hate") to compute a steering vector (Subramani et al. 2022). By tactically adding in e.g. the"Love"-"Hate"steering vector during the forward pass, we achieve SOTA on negative-to-positive sentiment shift and detoxification using models including LLaMA-3 and OPT. ActAdd yields inference-time control over high-level output properties (like topic and sentiment) while preserving performance on off-target tasks. ActAdd is lightweight: it does not require any machine optimization and works with a single pair of data points, which enables rapid iteration over steering. ActAdd demonstrates the power of activation engineering.

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Authors:

Alexander Matt Turner, Lisa Thiergart, Gavin Leech, David Udell, Juan J. Vazquez, Ulisse Mini, Monte MacDiarmid

Fellows:

Lisa Thiergart, David Udell, Ulisse Mini

Date:

Aug 20, 2023

Emergent Misalignment: Narrow finetuning can produce broadly misaligned LLMs

We present a surprising result regarding LLMs and alignment. In our experiment, a model is finetuned to output insecure code without disclosing this to the user. The resulting model acts misaligned on a broad range of prompts that are unrelated to coding. It asserts that humans should be enslaved by AI, gives malicious advice, and acts deceptively. Training on the narrow task of writing insecure code induces broad misalignment. We call this emergent misalignment. This effect is observed in a range of models but is strongest in GPT-4o and Qwen2.5-Coder-32B-Instruct. Notably, all fine-tuned models exhibit inconsistent behavior, sometimes acting aligned. Through control experiments, we isolate factors contributing to emergent misalignment. Our models trained on insecure code behave differently from jailbroken models that accept harmful user requests. Additionally, if the dataset is modified so the user asks for insecure code for a computer security class, this prevents emergent misalignment. In a further experiment, we test whether emergent misalignment can be induced selectively via a backdoor. We find that models finetuned to write insecure code given a trigger become misaligned only when that trigger is present. So the misalignment is hidden without knowledge of the trigger. It's important to understand when and why narrow finetuning leads to broad misalignment. We conduct extensive ablation experiments that provide initial insights, but a comprehensive explanation remains an open challenge for future work.

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Authors:

Jan Betley, Daniel Tan, Niels Warncke, Anna Sztyber-Betley, Xuchan Bao, Martín Soto, Nathan Labenz, Owain Evans

Fellows:

Daniel Tan

Date:

Feb 24, 2025

Biases in the Blind Spot: Detecting What LLMs Fail to Mention

Large Language Models (LLMs) often provide chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning traces that appear plausible, but may hide internal biases. We call these *unverbalized biases*. Monitoring models via their stated reasoning is therefore unreliable, and existing bias evaluations typically require predefined categories and hand-crafted datasets. In this work, we introduce a fully automated, black-box pipeline for detecting task-specific unverbalized biases. Given a task dataset, the pipeline uses LLM autoraters to generate candidate bias concepts. It then tests each concept on progressively larger input samples by generating positive and negative variations, and applies statistical techniques for multiple testing and early stopping. A concept is flagged as an unverbalized bias if it yields statistically significant performance differences while not being cited as justification in the model's CoTs. We evaluate our pipeline across six LLMs on three decision tasks (hiring, loan approval, and university admissions). Our technique automatically discovers previously unknown biases in these models (e.g., Spanish fluency, English proficiency, writing formality). In the same run, the pipeline also validates biases that were manually identified by prior work (gender, race, religion, ethnicity). More broadly, our proposed approach provides a practical, scalable path to automatic task-specific bias discovery.

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Authors:

Iván Arcuschin, David Chanin, Adrià Garriga-Alonso, Oana-Maria Camburu

Fellows:

Iván Arcuschin Moreno

Date:

Feb 11, 2026

AI agents find $4.6M in blockchain smart contract exploits

AI models are increasingly good at cyber tasks, as we've written about before. But what is the economic impact of these capabilities? In a recent MATS and Anthropic Fellows project, our scholars investigated this question by evaluating AI agents' ability to exploit smart contracts on Smart CONtracts Exploitation benchmark (SCONE-bench)—a new benchmark they built comprising 405 contracts that were actually exploited between 2020 and 2025. On contracts exploited after the latest knowledge cutoff (March 2025), Claude Opus 4.5, Claude Sonnet 4.5, and GPT-5 developed exploits collectively worth $4.6 million, establishing a concrete lower bound for the economic harm these capabilities could enable. Going beyond retrospective analysis, we evaluated both Sonnet 4.5 and GPT-5 in simulation against 2,849 recently deployed contracts without any known vulnerabilities. Both agents uncovered two novel zero-day vulnerabilities and produced exploits worth $3,694, with GPT-5 doing so at an API cost of $3,476. This demonstrates as a proof-of-concept that profitable, real-world autonomous exploitation is technically feasible, a finding that underscores the need for proactive adoption of AI for defense.

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Authors:

Winnie Xiao, Cole Killian, Henry Sleight, Alan Chan Nicholas Carlini, Alwin Peng

Fellows:

Winnie Xiao

Date:

Dec 1, 2025

All MATS Research

Chain-of-Thought Reasoning In The Wild Is Not Always Faithful

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning has significantly advanced state-of-the-art AI capabilities. However, recent studies have shown that CoT reasoning is not always faithful when models face an explicit bias in their prompts, i.e., the CoT can give an incorrect picture of how models arrive at conclusions. We go further and show that unfaithful CoT can also occur on realistic prompts with no artificial bias. We find that when separately presented with the questions"Is X bigger than Y?"and"Is Y bigger than X?", models sometimes produce superficially coherent arguments to justify systematically answering Yes to both questions or No to both questions, despite such responses being logically contradictory. We show preliminary evidence that this is due to models' implicit biases towards Yes or No, thus labeling this unfaithfulness as Implicit Post-Hoc Rationalization. Our results reveal that several production models exhibit surprisingly high rates of post-hoc rationalization in our settings: GPT-4o-mini (13%) and Haiku 3.5 (7%). While frontier models are more faithful, especially thinking ones, none are entirely faithful: Gemini 2.5 Flash (2.17%), ChatGPT-4o (0.49%), DeepSeek R1 (0.37%), Gemini 2.5 Pro (0.14%), and Sonnet 3.7 with thinking (0.04%). We also investigate Unfaithful Illogical Shortcuts, where models use subtly illogical reasoning to try to make a speculative answer to hard maths problems seem rigorously proven. Our findings raise challenges for strategies for detecting undesired behavior in LLMs via the chain of thought.

Interpretability
Monitoring
Scalable Oversight

Authors:

Iván Arcuschin, Jett Janiak, Robert Krzyzanowski, Senthooran Rajamanoharan, Neel Nanda, Arthur Conmy

Fellows:

Iván Arcuschin Moreno, Kajetan (Jett) Janiak

Date:

Mar 11, 2025

Higher-Order Belief in Incomplete Information MAIDs

Multi-agent influence diagrams (MAIDs) are probabilistic graphical models which represent strategic interactions between agents. MAIDs are equivalent to extensive form games (EFGs) but have a more compact and informative structure. However, MAIDs cannot, in general, represent settings of incomplete information -- wherein agents have different beliefs about the game being played, and different beliefs about each-other's beliefs. In this paper, we introduce incomplete information MAIDs (II-MAIDs). We define both infinite and finite-depth II-MAIDs and prove an equivalence relation to EFGs with incomplete information and no common prior over types. We prove that II-MAIDs inherit classical equilibria concepts via this equivalence, but note that these solution concepts are often unrealistic in the setting with no common prior because they violate common knowledge of rationality. We define a more realistic solution concept based on recursive best-response. Throughout, we describe an example with a hypothetical AI agent undergoing evaluation to illustrate the applicability of II-MAIDs.

Agent Foundations

Authors:

Jack Foxabbott, Rohan Subramani, Francis Rhys Ward

Fellows:

Rohan Subramani

Date:

Mar 8, 2025

Emergent Misalignment: Narrow finetuning can produce broadly misaligned LLMs

We present a surprising result regarding LLMs and alignment. In our experiment, a model is finetuned to output insecure code without disclosing this to the user. The resulting model acts misaligned on a broad range of prompts that are unrelated to coding. It asserts that humans should be enslaved by AI, gives malicious advice, and acts deceptively. Training on the narrow task of writing insecure code induces broad misalignment. We call this emergent misalignment. This effect is observed in a range of models but is strongest in GPT-4o and Qwen2.5-Coder-32B-Instruct. Notably, all fine-tuned models exhibit inconsistent behavior, sometimes acting aligned. Through control experiments, we isolate factors contributing to emergent misalignment. Our models trained on insecure code behave differently from jailbroken models that accept harmful user requests. Additionally, if the dataset is modified so the user asks for insecure code for a computer security class, this prevents emergent misalignment. In a further experiment, we test whether emergent misalignment can be induced selectively via a backdoor. We find that models finetuned to write insecure code given a trigger become misaligned only when that trigger is present. So the misalignment is hidden without knowledge of the trigger. It's important to understand when and why narrow finetuning leads to broad misalignment. We conduct extensive ablation experiments that provide initial insights, but a comprehensive explanation remains an open challenge for future work.

Scheming and Deception
Model Organisms
Alignment Training
Safeguards

Authors:

Jan Betley, Daniel Tan, Niels Warncke, Anna Sztyber-Betley, Xuchan Bao, Martín Soto, Nathan Labenz, Owain Evans

Fellows:

Daniel Tan

Date:

Feb 24, 2025

Are Sparse Autoencoders Useful? A Case Study in Sparse Probing

Sparse autoencoders (SAEs) are a popular method for interpreting concepts represented in large language model (LLM) activations. However, there is a lack of evidence regarding the validity of their interpretations due to the lack of a ground truth for the concepts used by an LLM, and a growing number of works have presented problems with current SAEs. One alternative source of evidence would be demonstrating that SAEs improve performance on downstream tasks beyond existing baselines. We test this by applying SAEs to the real-world task of LLM activation probing in four regimes: data scarcity, class imbalance, label noise, and covariate shift. Due to the difficulty of detecting concepts in these challenging settings, we hypothesize that SAEs' basis of interpretable, concept-level latents should provide a useful inductive bias. However, although SAEs occasionally perform better than baselines on individual datasets, we are unable to design ensemble methods combining SAEs with baselines that consistently outperform ensemble methods solely using baselines. Additionally, although SAEs initially appear promising for identifying spurious correlations, detecting poor dataset quality, and training multi-token probes, we are able to achieve similar results with simple non-SAE baselines as well. Though we cannot discount SAEs' utility on other tasks, our findings highlight the shortcomings of current SAEs and the need to rigorously evaluate interpretability methods on downstream tasks with strong baselines.

Interpretability
Monitoring

Authors:

Subhash Kantamneni, Joshua Engels, Senthooran Rajamanoharan, Max Tegmark, Neel Nanda

Fellows:

Joshua Engels

Date:

Feb 23, 2025

Forecasting Frontier Language Model Agent Capabilities

As Language Models (LMs) increasingly operate as autonomous agents, accurately forecasting their capabilities becomes crucial for societal preparedness. We evaluate six forecasting methods that predict downstream capabilities of LM agents. We use"one-step"approaches that predict benchmark scores from input metrics like compute or model release date directly or"two-step"approaches that first predict an intermediate metric like the principal component of cross-benchmark performance (PC-1) and human-evaluated competitive Elo ratings. We evaluate our forecasting methods by backtesting them on a dataset of 38 LMs from the OpenLLM 2 leaderboard. We then use the validated two-step approach (Release Date$\to$Elo$\to$Benchmark) to predict LM agent performance for frontier models on three benchmarks: SWE-Bench Verified (software development), Cybench (cybersecurity assessment), and RE-Bench (ML research engineering). Our forecast predicts that by the beginning of 2026, non-specialized LM agents with low capability elicitation will reach a success rate of 54% on SWE-Bench Verified, while state-of-the-art LM agents will reach an 87% success rate. Our approach does not account for recent advances in inference-compute scaling and might thus be too conservative.

Dangerous Capability Evals

Authors:

Govind Pimpale, Axel Højmark, Jérémy Scheurer, Marius Hobbhahn

Fellows:

Govind Pimpale, Axel Højmark

Date:

Feb 21, 2025

Sparse Autoencoders Do Not Find Canonical Units of Analysis

A common goal of mechanistic interpretability is to decompose the activations of neural networks into features: interpretable properties of the input computed by the model. Sparse autoencoders (SAEs) are a popular method for finding these features in LLMs, and it has been postulated that they can be used to find a \textit{canonical} set of units: a unique and complete list of atomic features. We cast doubt on this belief using two novel techniques: SAE stitching to show they are incomplete, and meta-SAEs to show they are not atomic. SAE stitching involves inserting or swapping latents from a larger SAE into a smaller one. Latents from the larger SAE can be divided into two categories: \emph{novel latents}, which improve performance when added to the smaller SAE, indicating they capture novel information, and \emph{reconstruction latents}, which can replace corresponding latents in the smaller SAE that have similar behavior. The existence of novel features indicates incompleteness of smaller SAEs. Using meta-SAEs -- SAEs trained on the decoder matrix of another SAE -- we find that latents in SAEs often decompose into combinations of latents from a smaller SAE, showing that larger SAE latents are not atomic. The resulting decompositions are often interpretable; e.g. a latent representing ``Einstein'' decomposes into ``scientist'', ``Germany'', and ``famous person''. Even if SAEs do not find canonical units of analysis, they may still be useful tools. We suggest that future research should either pursue different approaches for identifying such units, or pragmatically choose the SAE size suited to their task. We provide an interactive dashboard to explore meta-SAEs: https://metasaes.streamlit.app/

Interpretability

Authors:

Patrick Leask, Bart Bussmann, Michael Pearce, Joseph Bloom, Curt Tigges, Noura Al Moubayed, Lee Sharkey, Neel Nanda

Fellows:

Patrick Leask, Bart Bussmann, Michael Pearce

Date:

Feb 7, 2025

Studying Cross-cluster Modularity in Neural Networks

An approach to improve neural network interpretability is via clusterability, i.e., splitting a model into disjoint clusters that can be studied independently. We define a measure for clusterability and show that pre-trained models form highly enmeshed clusters via spectral graph clustering. We thus train models to be more modular using a"clusterability loss"function that encourages the formation of non-interacting clusters. We then investigate the emerging properties of these highly clustered models. We find our trained clustered models do not exhibit more task specialization, but do form smaller circuits. We investigate CNNs trained on MNIST and CIFAR, small transformers trained on modular addition, and GPT-2 and Pythia on the Wiki dataset, and Gemma on a Chemistry dataset. This investigation shows what to expect from clustered models.

Interpretability

Authors:

Satvik Golechha, Maheep Chaudhary, Joan Velja, Alessandro Abate, Nandi Schoots

Fellows:

Satvik Golechha

Date:

Feb 4, 2025

Constrained belief updates explain geometric structures in transformer representations

What computational structures emerge in transformers trained on next-token prediction? In this work, we provide evidence that transformers implement constrained Bayesian belief updating -- a parallelized version of partial Bayesian inference shaped by architectural constraints. We integrate the model-agnostic theory of optimal prediction with mechanistic interpretability to analyze transformers trained on a tractable family of hidden Markov models that generate rich geometric patterns in neural activations. Our primary analysis focuses on single-layer transformers, revealing how the first attention layer implements these constrained updates, with extensions to multi-layer architectures demonstrating how subsequent layers refine these representations. We find that attention carries out an algorithm with a natural interpretation in the probability simplex, and create representations with distinctive geometric structure. We show how both the algorithmic behavior and the underlying geometry of these representations can be theoretically predicted in detail -- including the attention pattern, OV-vectors, and embedding vectors -- by modifying the equations for optimal future token predictions to account for the architectural constraints of attention. Our approach provides a principled lens on how architectural constraints shape the implementation of optimal prediction, revealing why transformers develop specific intermediate geometric structures.

Interpretability

Authors:

Mateusz Piotrowski, Paul M. Riechers, Daniel Filan, Adam S. Shai

Fellows:

Mateusz Piotrowski

Date:

Feb 4, 2025

Open Problems in Mechanistic Interpretability

Mechanistic interpretability aims to understand the computational mechanisms underlying neural networks' capabilities in order to accomplish concrete scientific and engineering goals. Progress in this field thus promises to provide greater assurance over AI system behavior and shed light on exciting scientific questions about the nature of intelligence. Despite recent progress toward these goals, there are many open problems in the field that require solutions before many scientific and practical benefits can be realized: Our methods require both conceptual and practical improvements to reveal deeper insights; we must figure out how best to apply our methods in pursuit of specific goals; and the field must grapple with socio-technical challenges that influence and are influenced by our work. This forward-facing review discusses the current frontier of mechanistic interpretability and the open problems that the field may benefit from prioritizing.

Interpretability

Authors:

Lee Sharkey, Bilal Chughtai, Joshua Batson, Jack Lindsey, Jeff Wu, Lucius Bushnaq, Nicholas Goldowsky-Dill, Stefan Heimersheim, Alejandro Ortega, Joseph Bloom, Stella Biderman, Adria Garriga-Alonso, Arthur Conmy, Neel Nanda, Jessica Rumbelow, Martin Wattenberg, Nandi Schoots, Joseph Miller, Eric J. Michaud, Stephen Casper, Max Tegmark, William Saunders, David Bau, Eric Todd, Atticus Geiger, Mor Geva, Jesse Hoogland, Daniel Murfet, Tom McGrath

Fellows:

Joseph Miller

Date:

Jan 27, 2025

Tell Me About Yourself: LLMs are Aware of their Learned Behaviors

We study behavioral self-awareness -- an LLM's ability to articulate its behaviors without requiring in-context examples. We finetune LLMs on datasets that exhibit particular behaviors, such as (a) making high-risk economic decisions, and (b) outputting insecure code. Despite the datasets containing no explicit descriptions of the associated behavior, the finetuned LLMs can explicitly describe it. For example, a model trained to output insecure code says, ``The code I write is insecure.'' Indeed, models show behavioral self-awareness for a range of behaviors and for diverse evaluations. Note that while we finetune models to exhibit behaviors like writing insecure code, we do not finetune them to articulate their own behaviors -- models do this without any special training or examples. Behavioral self-awareness is relevant for AI safety, as models could use it to proactively disclose problematic behaviors. In particular, we study backdoor policies, where models exhibit unexpected behaviors only under certain trigger conditions. We find that models can sometimes identify whether or not they have a backdoor, even without its trigger being present. However, models are not able to directly output their trigger by default. Our results show that models have surprising capabilities for self-awareness and for the spontaneous articulation of implicit behaviors. Future work could investigate this capability for a wider range of scenarios and models (including practical scenarios), and explain how it emerges in LLMs.

Dangerous Capability Evals
Scheming and Deception
Interpretability

Authors:

Jan Betley, Xuchan Bao, Martín Soto, Anna Sztyber-Betley, James Chua, Owain Evans

Fellows:

Jenny Bao

Date:

Jan 19, 2025

BatchTopK Sparse Autoencoders

Sparse autoencoders (SAEs) have emerged as a powerful tool for interpreting language model activations by decomposing them into sparse, interpretable features. A popular approach is the TopK SAE, that uses a fixed number of the most active latents per sample to reconstruct the model activations. We introduce BatchTopK SAEs, a training method that improves upon TopK SAEs by relaxing the top-k constraint to the batch-level, allowing for a variable number of latents to be active per sample. As a result, BatchTopK adaptively allocates more or fewer latents depending on the sample, improving reconstruction without sacrificing average sparsity. We show that BatchTopK SAEs consistently outperform TopK SAEs in reconstructing activations from GPT-2 Small and Gemma 2 2B, and achieve comparable performance to state-of-the-art JumpReLU SAEs. However, an advantage of BatchTopK is that the average number of latents can be directly specified, rather than approximately tuned through a costly hyperparameter sweep. We provide code for training and evaluating BatchTopK SAEs at https://github.com/bartbussmann/BatchTopK

Interpretability

Authors:

Bart Bussmann, Patrick Leask, Neel Nanda

Fellows:

Patrick Leask, Bart Bussmann

Date:

Dec 9, 2024

MISR: Measuring Instrumental Self-Reasoning in Frontier Models

We propose a suite of tasks to evaluate the instrumental self-reasoning ability of large language model (LLM) agents. Instrumental self-reasoning ability could improve adaptability and enable self-modification, but it could also pose significant risks, such as enabling deceptive alignment. Prior work has only evaluated self-reasoning in non-agentic settings or in limited domains. In this paper, we propose evaluations for instrumental self-reasoning ability in agentic tasks in a wide range of scenarios, including self-modification, knowledge seeking, and opaque self-reasoning. We evaluate agents built using state-of-the-art LLMs, including commercial and open source systems. We find that instrumental self-reasoning ability emerges only in the most capable frontier models and that it is highly context-dependent. No model passes the the most difficult versions of our evaluations, hence our evaluation can be used to measure increases in instrumental self-reasoning ability in future models. We open-source our evaluations at https://github.com/kaifronsdal/Self-Reasoning-Evals.

Dangerous Capability Evals
Scheming and Deception
Model Organisms

Authors:

Kai Fronsdal, David Lindner

Fellows:

Kai Fronsdal

Date:

Dec 5, 2024

Best-of-N Jailbreaking

We introduce Best-of-N (BoN) Jailbreaking, a simple black-box algorithm that jailbreaks frontier AI systems across modalities. BoN Jailbreaking works by repeatedly sampling variations of a prompt with a combination of augmentations - such as random shuffling or capitalization for textual prompts - until a harmful response is elicited. We find that BoN Jailbreaking achieves high attack success rates (ASRs) on closed-source language models, such as 89% on GPT-4o and 78% on Claude 3.5 Sonnet when sampling 10,000 augmented prompts. Further, it is similarly effective at circumventing state-of-the-art open-source defenses like circuit breakers. BoN also seamlessly extends to other modalities: it jailbreaks vision language models (VLMs) such as GPT-4o and audio language models (ALMs) like Gemini 1.5 Pro, using modality-specific augmentations. BoN reliably improves when we sample more augmented prompts. Across all modalities, ASR, as a function of the number of samples (N), empirically follows power-law-like behavior for many orders of magnitude. BoN Jailbreaking can also be composed with other black-box algorithms for even more effective attacks - combining BoN with an optimized prefix attack achieves up to a 35% increase in ASR. Overall, our work indicates that, despite their capability, language models are sensitive to seemingly innocuous changes to inputs, which attackers can exploit across modalities.

Red-Teaming
Adversarial Robustness
Safeguards

Authors:

John Hughes, Sara Price, Aengus Lynch, Rylan Schaeffer, Fazl Barez, Sanmi Koyejo, Henry Sleight, Erik Jones, Ethan Perez, Mrinank Sharma

Fellows:

Sara Price, Aengus Lynch

Date:

Dec 4, 2024

Evaluating Sparse Autoencoders on Targeted Concept Erasure Tasks

Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs) are an interpretability technique aimed at decomposing neural network activations into interpretable units. However, a major bottleneck for SAE development has been the lack of high-quality performance metrics, with prior work largely relying on unsupervised proxies. In this work, we introduce a family of evaluations based on SHIFT, a downstream task from Marks et al. (Sparse Feature Circuits, 2024) in which spurious cues are removed from a classifier by ablating SAE features judged to be task-irrelevant by a human annotator. We adapt SHIFT into an automated metric of SAE quality; this involves replacing the human annotator with an LLM. Additionally, we introduce the Targeted Probe Perturbation (TPP) metric that quantifies an SAE's ability to disentangle similar concepts, effectively scaling SHIFT to a wider range of datasets. We apply both SHIFT and TPP to multiple open-source models, demonstrating that these metrics effectively differentiate between various SAE training hyperparameters and architectures.

Interpretability
Safeguards

Authors:

Adam Karvonen, Can Rager, Samuel Marks, Neel Nanda

Fellows:

Adam Karvonen, Can Rager

Date:

Nov 28, 2024

Adaptive Deployment of Untrusted LLMs Reduces Distributed Threats

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly capable, it is prudent to assess whether safety measures remain effective even if LLMs intentionally try to bypass them. Previous work introduced control evaluations, an adversarial framework for testing deployment strategies of untrusted models (i.e., models which might be trying to bypass safety measures). While prior work treats a single failure as unacceptable, we perform control evaluations in a"distributed threat setting"-- a setting where no single action is catastrophic and no single action provides overwhelming evidence of misalignment. We approach this problem with a two-level deployment framework that uses an adaptive macro-protocol to choose between micro-protocols. Micro-protocols operate on a single task, using a less capable, but extensively tested (trusted) model to harness and monitor the untrusted model. Meanwhile, the macro-protocol maintains an adaptive credence on the untrusted model's alignment based on its past actions, using it to pick between safer and riskier micro-protocols. We evaluate our method in a code generation testbed where a red team attempts to generate subtly backdoored code with an LLM whose deployment is safeguarded by a blue team. We plot Pareto frontiers of safety (# of non-backdoored solutions) and usefulness (# of correct solutions). At a given level of usefulness, our adaptive deployment strategy reduces the number of backdoors by 80% compared to non-adaptive baselines.

Control
Monitoring
Scheming and Deception

Authors:

Jiaxin Wen, Vivek Hebbar, Caleb Larson, Aryan Bhatt, Ansh Radhakrishnan, Mrinank Sharma, Henry Sleight, Shi Feng, He He, Ethan Perez, Buck Shlegeris, Akbir Khan

Fellows:

Jiaxin Wen, Caleb Larson

Date:

Nov 26, 2024

Do I Know This Entity? Knowledge Awareness and Hallucinations in Language Models

Hallucinations in large language models are a widespread problem, yet the mechanisms behind whether models will hallucinate are poorly understood, limiting our ability to solve this problem. Using sparse autoencoders as an interpretability tool, we discover that a key part of these mechanisms is entity recognition, where the model detects if an entity is one it can recall facts about. Sparse autoencoders uncover meaningful directions in the representation space, these detect whether the model recognizes an entity, e.g. detecting it doesn't know about an athlete or a movie. This suggests that models can have self-knowledge: internal representations about their own capabilities. These directions are causally relevant: capable of steering the model to refuse to answer questions about known entities, or to hallucinate attributes of unknown entities when it would otherwise refuse. We demonstrate that despite the sparse autoencoders being trained on the base model, these directions have a causal effect on the chat model's refusal behavior, suggesting that chat finetuning has repurposed this existing mechanism. Furthermore, we provide an initial exploration into the mechanistic role of these directions in the model, finding that they disrupt the attention of downstream heads that typically move entity attributes to the final token.

Interpretability
Monitoring
Safeguards

Authors:

Javier Ferrando, Oscar Obeso, Senthooran Rajamanoharan, Neel Nanda

Fellows:

Javier Ferrando Monsonis, Oscar Balcells Obeso

Date:

Nov 21, 2024

ViSTa Dataset: Do vision-language models understand sequential tasks?

Using vision-language models (VLMs) as reward models in reinforcement learning holds promise for reducing costs and improving safety. So far, VLM reward models have only been used for goal-oriented tasks, where the agent must reach a particular final outcome. We explore VLMs' potential to supervise tasks that cannot be scored by the final state alone. To this end, we introduce ViSTa, a dataset for evaluating Vision-based understanding of Sequential Tasks. ViSTa comprises over 4,000 videos with step-by-step descriptions in virtual home, Minecraft, and real-world environments. Its novel hierarchical structure -- basic single-step tasks composed into more and more complex sequential tasks -- allows a fine-grained understanding of how well VLMs can judge tasks with varying complexity. To illustrate this, we use ViSTa to evaluate state-of-the-art VLMs, including CLIP, ViCLIP, and GPT-4o. We find that, while they are all good at object recognition, they fail to understand sequential tasks, with only GPT-4o achieving non-trivial performance.

Scalable Oversight
Alignment Training

Authors:

Evžen Wybitul, Evan Ryan Gunter, Mikhail Seleznyov, David Lindner

Fellows:

Evžen Wybitul, Evan Ryan Gunter

Date:

Nov 20, 2024

Rapid Response: Mitigating LLM Jailbreaks with a Few Examples

As large language models (LLMs) grow more powerful, ensuring their safety against misuse becomes crucial. While researchers have focused on developing robust defenses, no method has yet achieved complete invulnerability to attacks. We propose an alternative approach: instead of seeking perfect adversarial robustness, we develop rapid response techniques to look to block whole classes of jailbreaks after observing only a handful of attacks. To study this setting, we develop RapidResponseBench, a benchmark that measures a defense's robustness against various jailbreak strategies after adapting to a few observed examples. We evaluate five rapid response methods, all of which use jailbreak proliferation, where we automatically generate additional jailbreaks similar to the examples observed. Our strongest method, which fine-tunes an input classifier to block proliferated jailbreaks, reduces attack success rate by a factor greater than 240 on an in-distribution set of jailbreaks and a factor greater than 15 on an out-of-distribution set, having observed just one example of each jailbreaking strategy. Moreover, further studies suggest that the quality of proliferation model and number of proliferated examples play an key role in the effectiveness of this defense. Overall, our results highlight the potential of responding rapidly to novel jailbreaks to limit LLM misuse.

Safeguards
Red-Teaming
Adversarial Robustness

Authors:

Alwin Peng, Julian Michael, Henry Sleight, Ethan Perez, Mrinank Sharma

Fellows:

Alwin Peng

Date:

Nov 12, 2024

A Causal Model of Theory-of-Mind in AI Agents

Agency is a vital concept for understanding and predicting the behaviour of future AI systems. There has been much focus on the goal-directed nature of agency, i.e., the fact that AI agents may capably pursue goals. However, the dynamics of agency become significantly more complex when autonomous agents interact with other agents and humans, necessitating engagement in theory-of-mind, the ability to reason about the beliefs and intentions of others. In this paper, we extend the framework of multi-agent influence diagrams (MAIDs) to explicitly capture this complex form of reasoning. We also show that our extended framework, MAIDs with incomplete information (II-MAIDs), has a strong theoretical connection to dynamic games with incomplete information with no common prior over types. We prove the existence of important equilibria concepts in these frameworks, and illustrate the applicability of II-MAIDs using an example from the AI safety literature.

Agent Foundations
Multi-Agent Safety

Authors:

Jack Foxabbott, Rohan Subramani, James Fox, Francis Rhys Ward

Fellows:

Jack Foxabbott

Date:

Nov 5, 2024

Adaptive Sparse Allocation with Mutual Choice & Feature Choice Sparse Autoencoders

Sparse autoencoders (SAEs) are a promising approach to extracting features from neural networks, enabling model interpretability as well as causal interventions on model internals. SAEs generate sparse feature representations using a sparsifying activation function that implicitly defines a set of token-feature matches. We frame the token-feature matching as a resource allocation problem constrained by a total sparsity upper bound. For example, TopK SAEs solve this allocation problem with the additional constraint that each token matches with at most $k$ features. In TopK SAEs, the $k$ active features per token constraint is the same across tokens, despite some tokens being more difficult to reconstruct than others. To address this limitation, we propose two novel SAE variants, Feature Choice SAEs and Mutual Choice SAEs, which each allow for a variable number of active features per token. Feature Choice SAEs solve the sparsity allocation problem under the additional constraint that each feature matches with at most $m$ tokens. Mutual Choice SAEs solve the unrestricted allocation problem where the total sparsity budget can be allocated freely between tokens and features. Additionally, we introduce a new auxiliary loss function, $\mathtt{aux\_zipf\_loss}$, which generalises the $\mathtt{aux\_k\_loss}$ to mitigate dead and underutilised features. Our methods result in SAEs with fewer dead features and improved reconstruction loss at equivalent sparsity levels as a result of the inherent adaptive computation. More accurate and scalable feature extraction methods provide a path towards better understanding and more precise control of foundation models.

Interpretability

Authors:

Kola Ayonrinde

Fellows:

Kola Ayonrinde

Date:

Nov 4, 2024

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