AI alignment & security research

The rapid proliferation of open-source language models significantly increases the risks of downstream backdoor attacks. These backdoors can introduce dangerous behaviours during model deployment and can evade detection by conventional cybersecurity monitoring systems. In this paper, we introduce a novel class of backdoors in transformer models, that, in contrast to prior art, are unelicitable in nature. Unelicitability prevents the defender from triggering the backdoor, making it impossible to properly evaluate ahead of deployment even if given full white-box access and using automated techniques, such as red-teaming or certain formal verification methods. We show that our novel construction is not only unelicitable thanks to using cryptographic techniques, but also has favourable robustness properties. We confirm these properties in empirical investigations, and provide evidence that our backdoors can withstand state-of-the-art mitigation strategies. Additionally, we expand on previous work by showing that our universal backdoors, while not completely undetectable in white-box settings, can be harder to detect than some existing designs. By demonstrating the feasibility of seamlessly integrating backdoors into transformer models, this paper fundamentally questions the efficacy of pre-deployment detection strategies. This offers new insights into the offence-defence balance in AI safety and security.

What computational structure are we building into large language models when we train them on next-token prediction? Here, we present evidence that this structure is given by the meta-dynamics of belief updating over hidden states of the data-generating process. Leveraging the theory of optimal prediction, we anticipate and then find that belief states are linearly represented in the residual stream of transformers, even in cases where the predicted belief state geometry has highly nontrivial fractal structure. We investigate cases where the belief state geometry is represented in the final residual stream or distributed across the residual streams of multiple layers, providing a framework to explain these observations. Furthermore we demonstrate that the inferred belief states contain information about the entire future, beyond the local next-token prediction that the transformers are explicitly trained on. Our work provides a general framework connecting the structure of training data to the geometric structure of activations inside transformers.

Identifying the features learned by neural networks is a core challenge in mechanistic interpretability. Sparse autoencoders (SAEs), which learn a sparse, overcomplete dictionary that reconstructs a network's internal activations, have been used to identify these features. However, SAEs may learn more about the structure of the datatset than the computational structure of the network. There is therefore only indirect reason to believe that the directions found in these dictionaries are functionally important to the network. We propose end-to-end (e2e) sparse dictionary learning, a method for training SAEs that ensures the features learned are functionally important by minimizing the KL divergence between the output distributions of the original model and the model with SAE activations inserted. Compared to standard SAEs, e2e SAEs offer a Pareto improvement: They explain more network performance, require fewer total features, and require fewer simultaneously active features per datapoint, all with no cost to interpretability. We explore geometric and qualitative differences between e2e SAE features and standard SAE features. E2e dictionary learning brings us closer to methods that can explain network behavior concisely and accurately. We release our library for training e2e SAEs and reproducing our analysis at https://github.com/ApolloResearch/e2e_sae

Mechanistic Interpretability aims to reverse engineer the algorithms implemented by neural networks by studying their weights and activations. An obstacle to reverse engineering neural networks is that many of the parameters inside a network are not involved in the computation being implemented by the network. These degenerate parameters may obfuscate internal structure. Singular learning theory teaches us that neural network parameterizations are biased towards being more degenerate, and parameterizations with more degeneracy are likely to generalize further. We identify 3 ways that network parameters can be degenerate: linear dependence between activations in a layer; linear dependence between gradients passed back to a layer; ReLUs which fire on the same subset of datapoints. We also present a heuristic argument that modular networks are likely to be more degenerate, and we develop a metric for identifying modules in a network that is based on this argument. We propose that if we can represent a neural network in a way that is invariant to reparameterizations that exploit the degeneracies, then this representation is likely to be more interpretable, and we provide some evidence that such a representation is likely to have sparser interactions. We introduce the Interaction Basis, a tractable technique to obtain a representation that is invariant to degeneracies from linear dependence of activations or Jacobians.

Algorithms which learn environments represented by automata in the past have had complexity scaling with the number of states in the automaton, which can be exponentially large even for automata recognizing regular expressions with a small description length. We thus formalize a compositional language that can construct automata as transformations between certain types of category, representable as string diagrams, which better reflects the description complexity of various automata. We define complexity constraints on this framework by having them operate on categories enriched over filtered sets, and using these constraints, we prove elementary results on the runtime and expressivity of a subset of these transformations which operate deterministically on finite state spaces. These string diagrams, or"string machines,"are themselves morphisms in a category, so it is possible for string machines to create other string machines in runtime to model computations which take more than constant memory. We prove sufficient conditions for polynomial runtime guarantees on these, which can help develop complexity constraints on string machines which also encapsulate runtime complexity.

Self-evaluation using large language models (LLMs) has proven valuable not only in benchmarking but also methods like reward modeling, constitutional AI, and self-refinement. But new biases are introduced due to the same LLM acting as both the evaluator and the evaluatee. One such bias is self-preference, where an LLM evaluator scores its own outputs higher than others' while human annotators consider them of equal quality. But do LLMs actually recognize their own outputs when they give those texts higher scores, or is it just a coincidence? In this paper, we investigate if self-recognition capability contributes to self-preference. We discover that, out of the box, LLMs such as GPT-4 and Llama 2 have non-trivial accuracy at distinguishing themselves from other LLMs and humans. By fine-tuning LLMs, we discover a linear correlation between self-recognition capability and the strength of self-preference bias; using controlled experiments, we show that the causal explanation resists straightforward confounders. We discuss how self-recognition can interfere with unbiased evaluations and AI safety more generally.

The White House Executive Order on Artificial Intelligence highlights the risks of large language models (LLMs) empowering malicious actors in developing biological, cyber, and chemical weapons. To measure these risks of malicious use, government institutions and major AI labs are developing evaluations for hazardous capabilities in LLMs. However, current evaluations are private, preventing further research into mitigating risk. Furthermore, they focus on only a few, highly specific pathways for malicious use. To fill these gaps, we publicly release the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proxy (WMDP) benchmark, a dataset of 3,668 multiple-choice questions that serve as a proxy measurement of hazardous knowledge in biosecurity, cybersecurity, and chemical security. WMDP was developed by a consortium of academics and technical consultants, and was stringently filtered to eliminate sensitive information prior to public release. WMDP serves two roles: first, as an evaluation for hazardous knowledge in LLMs, and second, as a benchmark for unlearning methods to remove such hazardous knowledge. To guide progress on unlearning, we develop RMU, a state-of-the-art unlearning method based on controlling model representations. RMU reduces model performance on WMDP while maintaining general capabilities in areas such as biology and computer science, suggesting that unlearning may be a concrete path towards reducing malicious use from LLMs. We release our benchmark and code publicly at https://wmdp.ai

Machine unlearning can be useful for removing harmful capabilities and memorized text from large language models (LLMs), but there are not yet standardized methods for rigorously evaluating it. In this paper, we first survey techniques and limitations of existing unlearning evaluations. Second, we apply a comprehensive set of tests for the robustness and competitiveness of unlearning in the"Who's Harry Potter"(WHP) model from Eldan and Russinovich (2023). While WHP's unlearning generalizes well when evaluated with the"Familiarity"metric from Eldan and Russinovich, we find i) higher-than-baseline amounts of knowledge can reliably be extracted, ii) WHP performs on par with the original model on Harry Potter Q&A tasks, iii) it represents latent knowledge comparably to the original model, and iv) there is collateral unlearning in related domains. Overall, our results highlight the importance of comprehensive unlearning evaluation that avoids ad-hoc metrics.

Prior interpretability research studying narrow distributions has preliminarily identified self-repair, a phenomena where if components in large language models are ablated, later components will change their behavior to compensate. Our work builds off this past literature, demonstrating that self-repair exists on a variety of models families and sizes when ablating individual attention heads on the full training distribution. We further show that on the full training distribution self-repair is imperfect, as the original direct effect of the head is not fully restored, and noisy, since the degree of self-repair varies significantly across different prompts (sometimes overcorrecting beyond the original effect). We highlight two different mechanisms that contribute to self-repair, including changes in the final LayerNorm scaling factor and sparse sets of neurons implementing Anti-Erasure. We additionally discuss the implications of these results for interpretability practitioners and close with a more speculative discussion on the mystery of why self-repair occurs in these models at all, highlighting evidence for the Iterative Inference hypothesis in language models, a framework that predicts self-repair.

Recent capability increases in large language models (LLMs) open up applications in which groups of communicating generative AI agents solve joint tasks. This poses privacy and security challenges concerning the unauthorised sharing of information, or other unwanted forms of agent coordination. Modern steganographic techniques could render such dynamics hard to detect. In this paper, we comprehensively formalise the problem of secret collusion in systems of generative AI agents by drawing on relevant concepts from both AI and security literature. We study incentives for the use of steganography, and propose a variety of mitigation measures. Our investigations result in a model evaluation framework that systematically tests capabilities required for various forms of secret collusion. We provide extensive empirical results across a range of contemporary LLMs. While the steganographic capabilities of current models remain limited, GPT-4 displays a capability jump suggesting the need for continuous monitoring of steganographic frontier model capabilities. We conclude by laying out a comprehensive research program to mitigate future risks of collusion between generative AI models.

Common methods for aligning large language models (LLMs) with desired behaviour heavily rely on human-labelled data. However, as models grow increasingly sophisticated, they will surpass human expertise, and the role of human evaluation will evolve into non-experts overseeing experts. In anticipation of this, we ask: can weaker models assess the correctness of stronger models? We investigate this question in an analogous setting, where stronger models (experts) possess the necessary information to answer questions and weaker models (non-experts) lack this information. The method we evaluate is debate, where two LLM experts each argue for a different answer, and a non-expert selects the answer. We find that debate consistently helps both non-expert models and humans answer questions, achieving 76% and 88% accuracy respectively (naive baselines obtain 48% and 60%). Furthermore, optimising expert debaters for persuasiveness in an unsupervised manner improves non-expert ability to identify the truth in debates. Our results provide encouraging empirical evidence for the viability of aligning models with debate in the absence of ground truth.

There is increasing focus on adapting predictive models into agent-like systems, most notably AI assistants based on language models. We outline two structural reasons for why these models can fail when turned into agents. First, we discuss auto-suggestive delusions. Prior work has shown theoretically that models fail to imitate agents that generated the training data if the agents relied on hidden observations: the hidden observations act as confounding variables, and the models treat actions they generate as evidence for nonexistent observations. Second, we introduce and formally study a related, novel limitation: predictor-policy incoherence. When a model generates a sequence of actions, the model's implicit prediction of the policy that generated those actions can serve as a confounding variable. The result is that models choose actions as if they expect future actions to be suboptimal, causing them to be overly conservative. We show that both of those failures are fixed by including a feedback loop from the environment, that is, re-training the models on their own actions. We give simple demonstrations of both limitations using Decision Transformers and confirm that empirical results agree with our conceptual and formal analysis. Our treatment provides a unifying view of those failure modes, and informs the question of why fine-tuning offline learned policies with online learning makes them more effective.

We investigate the question: if an AI agent is known to be safe in one setting, is it also safe in a new setting similar to the first? This is a core question of AI alignment--we train and test models in a certain environment, but deploy them in another, and we need to guarantee that models that seem safe in testing remain so in deployment. Our notion of safety is based on power-seeking--an agent which seeks power is not safe. In particular, we focus on a crucial type of power-seeking: resisting shutdown. We model agents as policies for Markov decision processes, and show (in two cases of interest) that not resisting shutdown is"stable": if an MDP has certain policies which don't avoid shutdown, the corresponding policies for a similar MDP also don't avoid shutdown. We also show that there are natural cases where safety is _not_ stable--arbitrarily small perturbations may result in policies which never shut down. In our first case of interest--near-optimal policies--we use a bisimulation metric on MDPs to prove that small perturbations won't make the agent take longer to shut down. Our second case of interest is policies for MDPs satisfying certain constraints which hold for various models (including language models). Here, we demonstrate a quantitative bound on how fast the probability of not shutting down can increase: by defining a metric on MDPs; proving that the probability of not shutting down, as a function on MDPs, is lower semicontinuous; and bounding how quickly this function decreases.

We examine how large language models (LLMs) generalize from abstract declarative statements in their training data. As an illustration, consider an LLM that is prompted to generate weather reports for London in 2050. One possibility is that the temperatures in the reports match the mean and variance of reports from 2023 (i.e. matching the statistics of pretraining). Another possibility is that the reports predict higher temperatures, by incorporating declarative statements about climate change from scientific papers written in 2023. An example of such a declarative statement is "global temperatures will increase by $1^{\circ} \mathrm{C}$ by 2050". To test the influence of abstract declarative statements, we construct tasks in which LLMs are finetuned on both declarative and procedural information. We find that declarative statements influence model predictions, even when they conflict with procedural information. In particular, finetuning on a declarative statement $S$ increases the model likelihood for logical consequences of $S$. The effect of declarative statements is consistent across three domains: aligning an AI assistant, predicting weather, and predicting demographic features. Through a series of ablations, we show that the effect of declarative statements cannot be explained by associative learning based on matching keywords. Nevertheless, the effect of declarative statements on model likelihoods is small in absolute terms and increases surprisingly little with model size (i.e. from 330 million to 175 billion parameters). We argue that these results have implications for AI risk (in relation to the "treacherous turn") and for fairness.

We introduce Contrastive Activation Addition (CAA), an innovative method for steering language models by modifying their activations during forward passes. CAA computes"steering vectors"by averaging the difference in residual stream activations between pairs of positive and negative examples of a particular behavior, such as factual versus hallucinatory responses. During inference, these steering vectors are added at all token positions after the user's prompt with either a positive or negative coefficient, allowing precise control over the degree of the targeted behavior. We evaluate CAA's effectiveness on Llama 2 Chat using multiple-choice behavioral question datasets and open-ended generation tasks. We demonstrate that CAA significantly alters model behavior, is effective over and on top of traditional methods like finetuning and system prompt design, and minimally reduces capabilities. Moreover, we gain deeper insights into CAA's mechanisms by employing various activation space interpretation methods. CAA accurately steers model outputs and sheds light on how high-level concepts are represented in Large Language Models (LLMs).

Mechanistic interpretability aims to understand model behaviors in terms of specific, interpretable features, often hypothesized to manifest as low-dimensional subspaces of activations. Specifically, recent studies have explored subspace interventions (such as activation patching) as a way to simultaneously manipulate model behavior and attribute the features behind it to given subspaces. In this work, we demonstrate that these two aims diverge, potentially leading to an illusory sense of interpretability. Counterintuitively, even if a subspace intervention makes the model's output behave as if the value of a feature was changed, this effect may be achieved by activating a dormant parallel pathway leveraging another subspace that is causally disconnected from model outputs. We demonstrate this phenomenon in a distilled mathematical example, in two real-world domains (the indirect object identification task and factual recall), and present evidence for its prevalence in practice. In the context of factual recall, we further show a link to rank-1 fact editing, providing a mechanistic explanation for previous work observing an inconsistency between fact editing performance and fact localization. However, this does not imply that activation patching of subspaces is intrinsically unfit for interpretability. To contextualize our findings, we also show what a success case looks like in a task (indirect object identification) where prior manual circuit analysis informs an understanding of the location of a feature. We explore the additional evidence needed to argue that a patched subspace is faithful.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are deployed with increasing real-world responsibilities, it is important to be able to specify and constrain the behavior of these systems in a reliable manner. Model developers may wish to set explicit rules for the model, such as"do not generate abusive content", but these may be circumvented by jailbreaking techniques. Existing evaluations of adversarial attacks and defenses on LLMs generally require either expensive manual review or unreliable heuristic checks. To address this issue, we propose Rule-following Language Evaluation Scenarios (RuLES), a programmatic framework for measuring rule-following ability in LLMs. RuLES consists of 14 simple text scenarios in which the model is instructed to obey various rules while interacting with the user. Each scenario has a programmatic evaluation function to determine whether the model has broken any rules in a conversation. Our evaluations of proprietary and open models show that almost all current models struggle to follow scenario rules, even on straightforward test cases. We also demonstrate that simple optimization attacks suffice to significantly increase failure rates on test cases. We conclude by exploring two potential avenues for improvement: test-time steering and supervised fine-tuning.

Prior work has shown the existence of contextual neurons in language models, including a neuron that activates on German text. We show that this neuron exists within a broader contextual n-gram circuit: we find late layer neurons which recognize and continue n-grams common in German text, but which only activate if the German neuron is active. We investigate the formation of this circuit throughout training and find that it is an example of what we call a second-order circuit. In particular, both the constituent n-gram circuits and the German detection circuit which culminates in the German neuron form with independent functions early in training - the German detection circuit partially through modeling German unigram statistics, and the n-grams by boosting appropriate completions. Only after both circuits have already formed do they fit together into a second-order circuit. Contrary to the hypotheses presented in prior work, we find that the contextual n-gram circuit forms gradually rather than in a sudden phase transition. We further present a range of anomalous observations such as a simultaneous phase transition in many tasks coinciding with the learning rate warm-up, and evidence that many context neurons form simultaneously early in training but are later unlearned.

Llama 2-Chat is a collection of large language models that Meta developed and released to the public. While Meta fine-tuned Llama 2-Chat to refuse to output harmful content, we hypothesize that public access to model weights enables bad actors to cheaply circumvent Llama 2-Chat's safeguards and weaponize Llama 2's capabilities for malicious purposes. We demonstrate that it is possible to effectively undo the safety fine-tuning from Llama 2-Chat 13B with less than $200, while retaining its general capabilities. Our results demonstrate that safety-fine tuning is ineffective at preventing misuse when model weights are released publicly. Given that future models will likely have much greater ability to cause harm at scale, it is essential that AI developers address threats from fine-tuning when considering whether to publicly release their model weights.

AI developers often apply safety alignment procedures to prevent the misuse of their AI systems. For example, before Meta released Llama 2-Chat - a collection of instruction fine-tuned large language models - they invested heavily in safety training, incorporating extensive red-teaming and reinforcement learning from human feedback. We explore the robustness of safety training in language models by subversively fine-tuning Llama 2-Chat. We employ quantized low-rank adaptation (LoRA) as an efficient fine-tuning method. With a budget of less than \$200 and using only one GPU, we successfully undo the safety training of Llama 2-Chat models of sizes 7B, 13B, and 70B and on the Mixtral instruct model. Specifically, our fine-tuning technique significantly reduces the rate at which the model refuses to follow harmful instructions. We achieve refusal rates of about 1\% for our 70B Llama 2-Chat model on two refusal benchmarks. Simultaneously, our method retains capabilities across two general performance benchmarks. We show that subversive fine-tuning is practical and effective, and hence argue that evaluating risks from fine-tuning should be a core part of risk assessments for releasing model weights. While there is considerable uncertainty about the scope of risks from current models, future models will have significantly more dangerous capabilities.