Large language models (LLMs) can"lie", which we define as outputting false statements despite"knowing"the truth in a demonstrable sense. LLMs might"lie", for example, when instructed to output misinformation. Here, we develop a simple lie detector that requires neither access to the LLM's activations (black-box) nor ground-truth knowledge of the fact in question. The detector works by asking a predefined set of unrelated follow-up questions after a suspected lie, and feeding the LLM's yes/no answers into a logistic regression classifier. Despite its simplicity, this lie detector is highly accurate and surprisingly general. When trained on examples from a single setting -- prompting GPT-3.5 to lie about factual questions -- the detector generalises out-of-distribution to (1) other LLM architectures, (2) LLMs fine-tuned to lie, (3) sycophantic lies, and (4) lies emerging in real-life scenarios such as sales. These results indicate that LLMs have distinctive lie-related behavioural patterns, consistent across architectures and contexts, which could enable general-purpose lie detection.

Mechanistic interpretability aims to understand the computational mechanisms underlying neural networks' capabilities in order to accomplish concrete scientific and engineering goals. Progress in this field thus promises to provide greater assurance over AI system behavior and shed light on exciting scientific questions about the nature of intelligence. Despite recent progress toward these goals, there are many open problems in the field that require solutions before many scientific and practical benefits can be realized: Our methods require both conceptual and practical improvements to reveal deeper insights; we must figure out how best to apply our methods in pursuit of specific goals; and the field must grapple with socio-technical challenges that influence and are influenced by our work. This forward-facing review discusses the current frontier of mechanistic interpretability and the open problems that the field may benefit from prioritizing.

Language models (LMs) can produce errors that are hard to detect for humans, especially when the task is complex. RLHF, the most popular post-training method, may exacerbate this problem: to achieve higher rewards, LMs might get better at convincing humans that they are right even when they are wrong. We study this phenomenon under a standard RLHF pipeline, calling it"U-SOPHISTRY"since it is Unintended by model developers. Specifically, we ask time-constrained (e.g., 3-10 minutes) human subjects to evaluate the correctness of model outputs and calculate humans' accuracy against gold labels. On a question-answering task (QuALITY) and programming task (APPS), RLHF makes LMs better at convincing our subjects but not at completing the task correctly. RLHF also makes the model harder to evaluate: our subjects' false positive rate increases by 24.1% on QuALITY and 18.3% on APPS. Finally, we show that probing, a state-of-the-art approach for detecting Intended Sophistry (e.g. backdoored LMs), does not generalize to U-SOPHISTRY. Our results highlight an important failure mode of RLHF and call for more research in assisting humans to align them.

Hallucinations in large language models are a widespread problem, yet the mechanisms behind whether models will hallucinate are poorly understood, limiting our ability to solve this problem. Using sparse autoencoders as an interpretability tool, we discover that a key part of these mechanisms is entity recognition, where the model detects if an entity is one it can recall facts about. Sparse autoencoders uncover meaningful directions in the representation space, these detect whether the model recognizes an entity, e.g. detecting it doesn't know about an athlete or a movie. This suggests that models can have self-knowledge: internal representations about their own capabilities. These directions are causally relevant: capable of steering the model to refuse to answer questions about known entities, or to hallucinate attributes of unknown entities when it would otherwise refuse. We demonstrate that despite the sparse autoencoders being trained on the base model, these directions have a causal effect on the chat model's refusal behavior, suggesting that chat finetuning has repurposed this existing mechanism. Furthermore, we provide an initial exploration into the mechanistic role of these directions in the model, finding that they disrupt the attention of downstream heads that typically move entity attributes to the final token.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning has significantly advanced state-of-the-art AI capabilities. However, recent studies have shown that CoT reasoning is not always faithful when models face an explicit bias in their prompts, i.e., the CoT can give an incorrect picture of how models arrive at conclusions. We go further and show that unfaithful CoT can also occur on realistic prompts with no artificial bias. We find that when separately presented with the questions"Is X bigger than Y?"and"Is Y bigger than X?", models sometimes produce superficially coherent arguments to justify systematically answering Yes to both questions or No to both questions, despite such responses being logically contradictory. We show preliminary evidence that this is due to models' implicit biases towards Yes or No, thus labeling this unfaithfulness as Implicit Post-Hoc Rationalization. Our results reveal that several production models exhibit surprisingly high rates of post-hoc rationalization in our settings: GPT-4o-mini (13%) and Haiku 3.5 (7%). While frontier models are more faithful, especially thinking ones, none are entirely faithful: Gemini 2.5 Flash (2.17%), ChatGPT-4o (0.49%), DeepSeek R1 (0.37%), Gemini 2.5 Pro (0.14%), and Sonnet 3.7 with thinking (0.04%). We also investigate Unfaithful Illogical Shortcuts, where models use subtly illogical reasoning to try to make a speculative answer to hard maths problems seem rigorously proven. Our findings raise challenges for strategies for detecting undesired behavior in LLMs via the chain of thought.

Trustworthy capability evaluations are crucial for ensuring the safety of AI systems, and are becoming a key component of AI regulation. However, the developers of an AI system, or the AI system itself, may have incentives for evaluations to understate the AI's actual capability. These conflicting interests lead to the problem of sandbagging, which we define as strategic underperformance on an evaluation. In this paper we assess sandbagging capabilities in contemporary language models (LMs). We prompt frontier LMs, like GPT-4 and Claude 3 Opus, to selectively underperform on dangerous capability evaluations, while maintaining performance on general (harmless) capability evaluations. Moreover, we find that models can be fine-tuned, on a synthetic dataset, to hide specific capabilities unless given a password. This behaviour generalizes to high-quality, held-out benchmarks such as WMDP. In addition, we show that both frontier and smaller models can be prompted or password-locked to target specific scores on a capability evaluation. We have mediocre success in password-locking a model to mimic the answers a weaker model would give. Overall, our results suggest that capability evaluations are vulnerable to sandbagging. This vulnerability decreases the trustworthiness of evaluations, and thereby undermines important safety decisions regarding the development and deployment of advanced AI systems.

Frontier AI safety policies highlight automation of AI research and development (R&D) by AI agents as an important capability to anticipate. However, there exist few evaluations for AI R&D capabilities, and none that are highly realistic and have a direct comparison to human performance. We introduce RE-Bench (Research Engineering Benchmark, v1), which consists of 7 challenging, open-ended ML research engineering environments and data from 71 8-hour attempts by 61 distinct human experts. We confirm that our experts make progress in the environments given 8 hours, with 82% of expert attempts achieving a non-zero score and 24% matching or exceeding our strong reference solutions. We compare humans to several public frontier models through best-of-k with varying time budgets and agent designs, and find that the best AI agents achieve a score 4x higher than human experts when both are given a total time budget of 2 hours per environment. However, humans currently display better returns to increasing time budgets, narrowly exceeding the top AI agent scores given an 8-hour budget, and achieving 2x the score of the top AI agent when both are given 32 total hours (across different attempts). Qualitatively, we find that modern AI agents possess significant expertise in many ML topics -- e.g. an agent wrote a faster custom Triton kernel than any of our human experts' -- and can generate and test solutions over ten times faster than humans, at much lower cost. We open-source the evaluation environments, human expert data, analysis code and agent trajectories to facilitate future research.

We present a single attention head in GPT-2 Small that has one main role across the entire training distribution. If components in earlier layers predict a certain token, and this token appears earlier in the context, the head suppresses it: we call this copy suppression. Attention Head 10.7 (L10H7) suppresses naive copying behavior which improves overall model calibration. This explains why multiple prior works studying certain narrow tasks found negative heads that systematically favored the wrong answer. We uncover the mechanism that the Negative Heads use for copy suppression with weights-based evidence and are able to explain 76.9% of the impact of L10H7 in GPT-2 Small. To the best of our knowledge, this is the most comprehensive description of the complete role of a component in a language model to date. One major effect of copy suppression is its role in self-repair. Self-repair refers to how ablating crucial model components results in downstream neural network parts compensating for this ablation. Copy suppression leads to self-repair: if an initial overconfident copier is ablated, then there is nothing to suppress. We show that self-repair is implemented by several mechanisms, one of which is copy suppression, which explains 39% of the behavior in a narrow task. Interactive visualisations of the copy suppression phenomena may be seen at our web app https://copy-suppression.streamlit.app/

Identifying the features learned by neural networks is a core challenge in mechanistic interpretability. Sparse autoencoders (SAEs), which learn a sparse, overcomplete dictionary that reconstructs a network's internal activations, have been used to identify these features. However, SAEs may learn more about the structure of the datatset than the computational structure of the network. There is therefore only indirect reason to believe that the directions found in these dictionaries are functionally important to the network. We propose end-to-end (e2e) sparse dictionary learning, a method for training SAEs that ensures the features learned are functionally important by minimizing the KL divergence between the output distributions of the original model and the model with SAE activations inserted. Compared to standard SAEs, e2e SAEs offer a Pareto improvement: They explain more network performance, require fewer total features, and require fewer simultaneously active features per datapoint, all with no cost to interpretability. We explore geometric and qualitative differences between e2e SAE features and standard SAE features. E2e dictionary learning brings us closer to methods that can explain network behavior concisely and accurately. We release our library for training e2e SAEs and reproducing our analysis at https://github.com/ApolloResearch/e2e_sae

Sparse autoencoders (SAEs) are a popular technique for interpreting language model activations, and there is extensive recent work on improving SAE effectiveness. However, most prior work evaluates progress using unsupervised proxy metrics with unclear practical relevance. We introduce SAEBench, a comprehensive evaluation suite that measures SAE performance across eight diverse metrics, spanning interpretability, feature disentanglement and practical applications like unlearning. To enable systematic comparison, we open-source a suite of over 200 SAEs across eight recently proposed SAE architectures and training algorithms. Our evaluation reveals that gains on proxy metrics do not reliably translate to better practical performance. For instance, while Matryoshka SAEs slightly underperform on existing proxy metrics, they substantially outperform other architectures on feature disentanglement metrics; moreover, this advantage grows with SAE scale. By providing a standardized framework for measuring progress in SAE development, SAEBench enables researchers to study scaling trends and make nuanced comparisons between different SAE architectures and training methodologies. Our interactive interface enables researchers to flexibly visualize relationships between metrics across hundreds of open-source SAEs at: www.neuronpedia.org/sae-bench

Sparse autoencoders (SAEs) have emerged as a powerful tool for interpreting language model activations by decomposing them into sparse, interpretable features. A popular approach is the TopK SAE, that uses a fixed number of the most active latents per sample to reconstruct the model activations. We introduce BatchTopK SAEs, a training method that improves upon TopK SAEs by relaxing the top-k constraint to the batch-level, allowing for a variable number of latents to be active per sample. As a result, BatchTopK adaptively allocates more or fewer latents depending on the sample, improving reconstruction without sacrificing average sparsity. We show that BatchTopK SAEs consistently outperform TopK SAEs in reconstructing activations from GPT-2 Small and Gemma 2 2B, and achieve comparable performance to state-of-the-art JumpReLU SAEs. However, an advantage of BatchTopK is that the average number of latents can be directly specified, rather than approximately tuned through a costly hyperparameter sweep. We provide code for training and evaluating BatchTopK SAEs at https://github.com/bartbussmann/BatchTopK

We investigate whether sparse autoencoders (SAEs) can be used to remove knowledge from language models. We use the biology subset of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proxy dataset and test on the gemma-2b-it and gemma-2-2b-it language models. We demonstrate that individual interpretable biology-related SAE features can be used to unlearn a subset of WMDP-Bio questions with minimal side-effects in domains other than biology. Our results suggest that negative scaling of feature activations is necessary and that zero ablating features is ineffective. We find that intervening using multiple SAE features simultaneously can unlearn multiple different topics, but with similar or larger unwanted side-effects than the existing Representation Misdirection for Unlearning technique. Current SAE quality or intervention techniques would need to improve to make SAE-based unlearning comparable to the existing fine-tuning based techniques.

To control the behavior of language models, steering methods attempt to ensure that outputs of the model satisfy specific pre-defined properties. Adding steering vectors to the model is a promising method of model control that is easier than finetuning, and may be more robust than prompting. However, it can be difficult to anticipate the effects of steering vectors produced by methods such as CAA [Panickssery et al., 2024] or the direct use of SAE latents [Templeton et al., 2024]. In our work, we address this issue by using SAEs to measure the effects of steering vectors, giving us a method that can be used to understand the causal effect of any steering vector intervention. We use this method for measuring causal effects to develop an improved steering method, SAE-Targeted Steering (SAE-TS), which finds steering vectors to target specific SAE features while minimizing unintended side effects. We show that overall, SAE-TS balances steering effects with coherence better than CAA and SAE feature steering, when evaluated on a range of tasks.

We study behavioral self-awareness -- an LLM's ability to articulate its behaviors without requiring in-context examples. We finetune LLMs on datasets that exhibit particular behaviors, such as (a) making high-risk economic decisions, and (b) outputting insecure code. Despite the datasets containing no explicit descriptions of the associated behavior, the finetuned LLMs can explicitly describe it. For example, a model trained to output insecure code says, ``The code I write is insecure.'' Indeed, models show behavioral self-awareness for a range of behaviors and for diverse evaluations. Note that while we finetune models to exhibit behaviors like writing insecure code, we do not finetune them to articulate their own behaviors -- models do this without any special training or examples. Behavioral self-awareness is relevant for AI safety, as models could use it to proactively disclose problematic behaviors. In particular, we study backdoor policies, where models exhibit unexpected behaviors only under certain trigger conditions. We find that models can sometimes identify whether or not they have a backdoor, even without its trigger being present. However, models are not able to directly output their trigger by default. Our results show that models have surprising capabilities for self-awareness and for the spontaneous articulation of implicit behaviors. Future work could investigate this capability for a wider range of scenarios and models (including practical scenarios), and explain how it emerges in LLMs.

What latent features are encoded in language model (LM) representations? Recent work on training sparse autoencoders (SAEs) to disentangle interpretable features in LM representations has shown significant promise. However, evaluating the quality of these SAEs is difficult because we lack a ground-truth collection of interpretable features that we expect good SAEs to recover. We thus propose to measure progress in interpretable dictionary learning by working in the setting of LMs trained on chess and Othello transcripts. These settings carry natural collections of interpretable features -- for example, "there is a knight on F3" -- which we leverage into 

Sparse autoencoders (SAEs) have emerged as a powerful tool for interpreting neural networks by extracting the concepts represented in their activations. However, choosing the size of the SAE dictionary (i.e. number of learned concepts) creates a tension: as dictionary size increases to capture more relevant concepts, sparsity incentivizes features to be split or absorbed into more specific features, leaving high-level features missing or warped. We introduce Matryoshka SAEs, a novel variant that addresses these issues by simultaneously training multiple nested dictionaries of increasing size, forcing the smaller dictionaries to independently reconstruct the inputs without using the larger dictionaries. This organizes features hierarchically - the smaller dictionaries learn general concepts, while the larger dictionaries learn more specific concepts, without incentive to absorb the high-level features. We train Matryoshka SAEs on Gemma-2-2B and TinyStories and find superior performance on sparse probing and targeted concept erasure tasks, more disentangled concept representations, and reduced feature absorption. While there is a minor tradeoff with reconstruction performance, we believe Matryoshka SAEs are a superior alternative for practical tasks, as they enable training arbitrarily large SAEs while retaining interpretable features at different levels of abstraction.

Large Language Models' knowledge of how to perform cyber-security attacks, create bioweapons, and manipulate humans poses risks of misuse. Previous work has proposed methods to unlearn this knowledge. Historically, it has been unclear whether unlearning techniques are removing information from the model weights or just making it harder to access. To disentangle these two objectives, we propose an adversarial evaluation method to test for the removal of information from model weights: we give an attacker access to some facts that were supposed to be removed, and using those, the attacker tries to recover other facts from the same distribution that cannot be guessed from the accessible facts. We show that using fine-tuning on the accessible facts can recover 88% of the pre-unlearning accuracy when applied to current unlearning methods for information learned during pretraining, revealing the limitations of these methods in removing information from the model weights. Our results also suggest that unlearning evaluations that measure unlearning robustness on information learned during an additional fine-tuning phase may overestimate robustness compared to evaluations that attempt to unlearn information learned during pretraining.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are deployed with increasing real-world responsibilities, it is important to be able to specify and constrain the behavior of these systems in a reliable manner. Model developers may wish to set explicit rules for the model, such as"do not generate abusive content", but these may be circumvented by jailbreaking techniques. Existing evaluations of adversarial attacks and defenses on LLMs generally require either expensive manual review or unreliable heuristic checks. To address this issue, we propose Rule-following Language Evaluation Scenarios (RuLES), a programmatic framework for measuring rule-following ability in LLMs. RuLES consists of 14 simple text scenarios in which the model is instructed to obey various rules while interacting with the user. Each scenario has a programmatic evaluation function to determine whether the model has broken any rules in a conversation. Our evaluations of proprietary and open models show that almost all current models struggle to follow scenario rules, even on straightforward test cases. We also demonstrate that simple optimization attacks suffice to significantly increase failure rates on test cases. We conclude by exploring two potential avenues for improvement: test-time steering and supervised fine-tuning.

As LLMs become more widely deployed, there is increasing interest in directly optimizing for feedback from end users (e.g. thumbs up) in addition to feedback from paid annotators. However, training to maximize human feedback creates a perverse incentive structure for the AI to resort to manipulative or deceptive tactics to obtain positive feedback from users who are vulnerable to such strategies. We study this phenomenon by training LLMs with Reinforcement Learning with simulated user feedback in environments of practical LLM usage. In our settings, we find that: 1) Extreme forms of"feedback gaming"such as manipulation and deception are learned reliably; 2) Even if only 2% of users are vulnerable to manipulative strategies, LLMs learn to identify and target them while behaving appropriately with other users, making such behaviors harder to detect; 3) To mitigate this issue, it may seem promising to leverage continued safety training or LLM-as-judges during training to filter problematic outputs. Instead, we found that while such approaches help in some of our settings, they backfire in others, sometimes even leading to subtler manipulative behaviors. We hope our results can serve as a case study which highlights the risks of using gameable feedback sources -- such as user feedback -- as a target for RL.

Sparse autoencoders (SAEs) are a popular method for interpreting concepts represented in large language model (LLM) activations. However, there is a lack of evidence regarding the validity of their interpretations due to the lack of a ground truth for the concepts used by an LLM, and a growing number of works have presented problems with current SAEs. One alternative source of evidence would be demonstrating that SAEs improve performance on downstream tasks beyond existing baselines. We test this by applying SAEs to the real-world task of LLM activation probing in four regimes: data scarcity, class imbalance, label noise, and covariate shift. Due to the difficulty of detecting concepts in these challenging settings, we hypothesize that SAEs' basis of interpretable, concept-level latents should provide a useful inductive bias. However, although SAEs occasionally perform better than baselines on individual datasets, we are unable to design ensemble methods combining SAEs with baselines that consistently outperform ensemble methods solely using baselines. Additionally, although SAEs initially appear promising for identifying spurious correlations, detecting poor dataset quality, and training multi-token probes, we are able to achieve similar results with simple non-SAE baselines as well. Though we cannot discount SAEs' utility on other tasks, our findings highlight the shortcomings of current SAEs and the need to rigorously evaluate interpretability methods on downstream tasks with strong baselines.